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STATE OF THE FIELD ESSAY 
LAW, RELIGION, AND THE COVID CRISIS 
Mark L. Movsesian 
Frederick A. Whitney Professor and Co-Director, Center for Law and Religion, St. John’s University 
 A Revealing Episode 
For well over a year, now, a big story in law and religion, in the United States and throughout 
the world, has been the Covid crisis. No one anticipated this. In the United States at the start of 2020, 
lawyers and scholars were preoccupied  with other issues, such as whether local governments could 
exclude religious schools from public scholarship programs,1 and whether religious believers could claim 
exemptions from public accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity.2 In Europe, jurists disputed whether states could legally restrict ritual animal 
slaughter by observant Jews and Muslims.3 Those debates have not ended. But a central issue on the 
law-and-religion agenda, one that has drawn academic, judicial, and popular attention, has turned out 
to be something completely different: whether, and to what extent, government can legally restrict 
collective worship during a public health emergency.  
It might seem premature to draw lessons from a crisis still underway. At this writing, in late 
summer 2021, it remains unclear how the pandemic will continue to unfold. Governments have 
rescinded most of the restrictions they placed on collective worship during the pandemic’s first year and 
the “flurry” of judicial decisions has ceased, at least for now.4 Perhaps Covid will ultimately fade from 
memory, much like the 1918 flu epidemic, and leave little trace on the law of church and state.5 But the 
rise of the Delta variant suggests Covid will be with us for some time. Moreover, enough case law exists 
to merit some early observations. Although crises can distort legal doctrine, they can also clarify, and 
that is the case here.6 As in other contexts, in law, the Covid pandemic has revealed dynamics that 
already existed and trends that were already underway.7  
In this essay, I draw two early lessons from the Covid crisis, one comparative and one relating 
specifically to United States law.8 A comparative approach is appropriate in this context. Sometimes, 
 
1 E.g., Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S.Ct. 2246 (2020). 
2 E.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S.Ct. 1868 (2021); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rts. Comm’n, 
138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018); cf. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1753-54 (2020).  
3 E.g., Judgment of 17 Dec. 2020, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België et al., C-336/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1031, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=235717&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=re
q&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=16882268.  
4 Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 16) 
(manuscript on file with author).  
5 See ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 p. 305 (2d ed. 2003).  
6 Cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 629, 645 (suggesting that “legally 
problematic responses to a crisis” can “cause lasting distortions to the law”).  
7  See Note, Constitutional Constraints on Free Exercise Analogies, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1782, 1785 (2021) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Constraints]. 
8 In the interests of space, I focus on cases from the United States and Europe, but “a steady stream of cases from 
around the world” have considered these issues as well. Mark Hill, Coronavirus and the Curtailment of Religious 
Liberty, 9 LAWS 1, 4 (2020). For more on the situation in Africa, see id. at 5, 6. For a discussion of government 
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legal problems differ in ways that make comparisons tricky; determining whether the problems 
sufficiently resemble one another can be vexing.9 In this crisis, however, courts faced the same problem: 
how to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus without infringing the right to corporate worship. 
They did so, moreover, in an emergency setting where conclusive evidence was unavailable and the 
consequences, quite literally, a matter of life and death.10 If any legal problems merit comparative 
analysis, this would seem to be one.  
A comparative analysis of courts’ response to restrictions on worship during Covid offers 
something of a surprise. With respect to restrictions on religious freedom, scholars often highlight the 
differences between the proportionality test that courts outside the United States favor and the U.S. 
approach under Employment Division v. Smith, a 1990 Supreme Court decision on the scope of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.11 Proportionality analysis expressly calls for judges to weigh the 
relative costs and benefits of a restriction,12 while Smith rejects judicial balancing in favor of legislative 
supremacy and predictable results.13 During the pandemic, however, whatever formal test they have 
applied, courts have approached the problem in essentially the same way, through intuition and 
balancing. Smith has failed to prevent judicial assessments of pros and cons, as critics long predicted it 
would.14  
Across the globe, the legality of Covid restrictions has depended ultimately on judges’ weighing 
of the competing interests at stake.15 This necessarily has entailed “value judgments” about the 
 
responses in Asia and Oceania, see generally Xioming Guo, An Academic Summary of the International Conference 
Series on “The Role of the Proportionality Principle in the Pandemic Prevention and Control, 29 J. HUM. RTS. 535 
(2020). For a discussion of some Covid restrictions in Latin America, see Javier Martínez-Torrón, COVID-19 and 
Religious Freedom: Some Comparative Perspectives, 10 LAWS 39, at 6 (Brazil), at 12 (Chile) (2021).  
9 See, e.g., Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies, 
32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 418 (2007). 
10 See Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that governments have “been forced to act with 
imperfect knowledge” when devising strategy during the Covid pandemic). Cf. Adelaide Madera, Some preliminary 
remarks on the impact of COVID-19 on the exercise of religious freedom in the United States and Italy, STATO, CHIESE 
E PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, No. 16, pp. 70, 77 (2020) (observing that the Covid crisis required the Italian 
government “to undertake . . . a complex balancing of many fundamental freedoms with the urgent need to 
protect public health and safety and to do so very quickly”).   
11 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For contrasts between the two approaches, see, for example, Justin Collings and Stephanie 
Hall Barclay, Taking Justification Seriously: Proportionality, Strict Scrutiny, and the Substance of Religious Liberty, __ 
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author) (suggesting that the two approaches are not 
“interchangeable when it comes to protecting religious exercise”). See also Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as 
Trumps, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34-35 (2018) (distinguishing proportionality analysis from U.S. “categoricalism”).  
12 See, e.g., PAUL YOWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 16 (2018) (describing the proportionality 
test). For more on the proportionality test, see infra text accompanying notes 26-33. 
13 Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 13) (arguing that Smith “openly and energetically eschewed 
any meaningful form of interest-balancing”). In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a religiously neutral and 
generally applicable law could permissibly restrict the exercise of religion, so long as the law had a rational basis. 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. For more on the Smith approach, see infra text accompanying notes 72-76.  
14 See, e.g., MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 150, 160-65 (2013) (arguing that Smith does not 
provide the predictability proponents claim).  
15 Cf. YOWELL, supra note 12, at 9 (noting how constitutional-rights adjudication in U.S. courts typically attempts to 
“strike the right balance between collective and individual interests”); First Amendment—Free Exercise Clause—
Government Aid to Religious Schools—Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 134 HARV. L. REV. 470, 477 
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importance of religious exercise, compared to things like grocery shopping and dining out, and the need 
to accommodate some religious believers.16 Judges have weighed things differently; some have upheld 
restrictions and others have not. The important comparative point, though, is that doctrinal nuances in 
U.S. and foreign law have made little apparent difference.17 The pandemic thus reveals affinities 
between proportionality analysis and the U.S. approach, at least in times of crisis.  
With respect to the United States, specifically, the crisis suggests a further lesson, not about 
affinities but about divisions. Scholars debate the extent to which ideological and political commitments 
affect judging generally.18 In the Covid crisis, however, judicial disagreements have closely tracked 
judges’ partisan identities.19 At the Supreme Court, Democratic-appointed justices consistently have 
ruled against religious plaintiffs in Covid cases. Republican-appointed justices, with one exception, 
consistently have ruled for religious plaintiffs, and the appointment of Justice Barrett to replace the late 
Justice Ginsburg during the pandemic decisively shifted the Court in their favor.20 As Zalman Rothschild 
writes, when the Court’s “political make-up shifted, so did its stance on COVID-19 restrictions on 
religious institutions.”21  
 These partisan divisions should come as no surprise. No completely neutral basis exists for 
deciding whether a government has restricted religious exercise more than necessary to achieve public 
health goals. At some point, “the relatively pure science runs out,” and decisions require “normatively 
contested moral and political judgments.”22 Judges, like the rest of us, naturally strike the balance based 
on “‘priors’”—commitments and intuitions about the comparative virtues and importance of religious 
exercise, for believers and for society.23 Those priors deeply divide Americans, and our divisions 
increasingly express themselves in partisan terms.24 In this environment, judges appointed by 
Republican presidents naturally tend to favor the claims of religious plaintiffs, while judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents naturally tend to disfavor them.  
 
(2020) (noting that many of the Supreme Court’s religion clause cases “boil down to raw interest-balancing 
exercises”). 
16 Note, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 7, at 1790. See also Josh Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise 
Clause, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 686 (2021).  
17 See Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3-4) (“religious liberty depends less on which framework 
is adopted than on how that framework is employed”) (emphasis in original).  
18 Compare Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated 
Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 354-55 (2016) (arguing that professional training and 
experience help judges overcome “political predispositions”) and Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Ideology “All 
the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 
1204 (2012) (arguing that judges’ politics and ideology play a major role in Establishment Clause cases). For more 
on the topic, see generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1643-44 (2018).  
19 See Rothschild, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3).  
20 See Blackman, supra note 16, at 638.  
21 Rothschild, supra note 4 (manuscript at 44).  
22 R. George Wright, Free Exercise and the Public Interest After Tandon v. Newsom, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 
194.  
23 Howard Kislowicz, Judging Religion and Judges’ Religions, 33 J. L. & RELIGION 42, 47 (2018) (citation omitted).  
24 See LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT 14 (2018). 
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The “pandemic,” in journalist Lawrence Wright’s words, has “exposed many different fractures” 
in U.S. society, not only concerning religion.25 Deep divisions exist about the good faith of elites, the 
competence and benevolence of government, the credibility of scientific opinion, and many other 
factors. All these divisions have influenced the ways in which citizens—and judges—have evaluated 
restrictions on communal worship. But varying opinions on the value of religion and religious freedom 
have had a central role in the Covid cases. In the United States, the Covid crisis has revealed a cultural 
and political rift that makes consensual resolution of conflicts over religious freedom problematic, and 
sometimes impossible, even during a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic.26 
Outside the United States: The Proportionality Test 
Outside the United States, courts have decided Covid cases under the so-called proportionality 
test,27 “the common method worldwide for adjudicating constitutional rights.”28 Proportionality analysis 
involves “a limitation phase and a justification phase.”29 In the limitation phase, the court asks whether 
the law in question “infringes or interferes with a right.”30 If the answer is yes, the court moves to the 
justification phase, which asks whether “the interference is justified in virtue of being proportionate to 
the aim or value of the law.”31 To decide whether a measure is justified, the court employs a three- or 
four-part test that asks, in one form or another, whether the law in question “(1) pursues a legitimate 
purpose, (2) actually advances that purpose, (3) restricts the right no more than is necessary to achieve 
the purpose, and (4) restricts the right in a proportionate way.”32 In practice, these requirements 
overlap, and the last two are the most significant, especially the necessity requirement, which in formal 
terms resembles the least-restrictive-means requirement in U.S. law.33 Indeed, according to Justin 
Collings and Stephanie Barclay, “many proportionality courts frequently end their analysis at the 
necessity step.”34  
Courts in many countries have applied proportionality analysis to Covid restrictions, including 
Canada, France, Germany, Greece, and Scotland, with mixed results.35 Some courts have found 
 
25 LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE PLAGUE YEAR: AMERICA IN THE TIME OF COVID 85 (2021).  
26 Cf. Wright, supra note 21, at 194 (noting that “normative judgments” about Covid restrictions “must be made in 
the context of a culture that has been increasingly fracturing, if not fragmenting, on relevant moral and political 
issues, for decades”).  
27 See Hill, supra note 8, at 3. For more on proportionality analysis and the Covid epidemic worldwide, see 
generally Guo, supra note 8.  
28 YOWELL, supra note 12, at 9. See also id. at 16; Greene, supra note 11, at 58.  
29 Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 17).  
30 YOWELL, supra note 12, at 15.  
31 Id. at 16.  
32 Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 17). See also Greene, supra note 11, at 59 (observing that 
“[t]ypical proportionality formulations comprise either three or four ordered steps in the analysis”).   
33 Paul Yowell observes that “[i]n strict scrutiny, courts ask whether there are less restrictive alternatives in 
determining whether the government measure is ‘narrowly tailored’—similarly to the necessity component of the 
European proportionality inquiry, which is sometimes phrased in terms of ‘minimal impairment’.” YOWELL, supra 
note 12, at 23.  
34 Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 21).  
35 See, e.g., George Androutsopoulos, The Right of Religious Freedom in Light of the Coronavirus Pandemic: The 
Greek Case, 10 LAWS 1 (2021) (Greece); Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 34-38) (Canada); id. at 
39-40 (Germany); Anne Fornerod, Freedom of Worship during a Public Health State of Emergency in France, 10 
LAWS 1 (2021) (France); Martínez-Torrón, supra note 8, at 12 (2021) (Scotland).  
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restrictions justified; others have not.36 Sometimes the same court has found restrictions justified at one 
stage of the pandemic but not at later stages, as more information about Covid-19 has become 
available.37 The French Council of State and German Federal Constitutional Court are good examples of 
this phenomenon.38 The details of specific restrictions presumably made some difference to the 
outcomes in these cases, as did the fact that various national legal systems, each with its own 
understanding of proportionality and its own rules “for the exercise of emergency powers,” were 
involved.39 But the main reason for the different results was surely the proportionality test itself, which 
relies so prominently on judicial line-drawing and balancing.40 Judges applying the proportionality test 
naturally weighed risks and benefits differently.  
A good example comes from Scotland. In Reverend Dr William J U Philip and Others,41 the Outer 
House of the Court of Session ruled that a ban on public worship violated the proportionality test under 
constitutional principles and under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
confers a right to manifest one’s religion in public, including through worship.42 In January 2021, during 
an outbreak of a virus variant, Scottish officials ordered places of worship in the country to close 
temporarily, except for a few limited purposes, including funerals, marriage ceremonies (comprising no 
more than 5-6 people), and “essential voluntary services” like “food banks,” “blood donation sessions,” 
and “vaccination centers.”43 The order effectively prevented “any form of communal worship” in 
Scotland, either “indoors or outdoors.”44 The closure also extended to movie theaters, sports stadiums, 
and conference centers, again with a few exceptions, and to most retail establishments, though not to 
“essential” businesses like “food retailers, pharmacies, funeral directors,” and “bicycle shops.”45  
The Scottish authorities and the claimants agreed that the ban on public worship interfered with 
the claimants’ right to manifest their religion.46 The proportionality analysis thus moved to the 
justification phase, which Lord Braid described as follows:   
 
36 See, e.g. Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 25) (noting French Council of State’s “rulings in favor 
of religious claimants); id. at 39 (discussing a ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court that certain Covid 
restrictions were not disproportionate).  
37 Cf. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that “within the same country, the courts’ approach has 
sometimes changed depending on the moment that the claim was decided”).  
38 On the French Council of State, see, for example, Fornerod, supra note 34, at 3. On the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, see Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript, at 39-40).  
39 Hill, supra note 8, at 4. Courts applying the proportionality test under the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights would also need to consider the margin of appreciation doctrine. For more on that doctrine, see, for 
example, JIM MURDOCH, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 41-43 (2012), available at https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Murdoch2012 EN.pdf.  
40 A debate exists on how much role balancing as such should have in proportionality analysis, see Greene, supra 
note 11, at 58, and as I explain in the text, courts frequently skip the final step of the analysis. But balancing is 
formally a fundamental part of the test, and even the “necessity” step can involve balancing, as courts try to 
determine whether the marginal benefit of a restriction, in terms of the legislature’s stated aim, outweighs the 
damage to a claimant’s rights. See Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 21).  
41 [2021] CSOH 32.  
42 Id. ¶ 127; see also id. ¶ 90 (quoting Article 9).  
43 Id. ¶¶ 16-17.  
44 Id. ¶ 17. 
45 Id. ¶ 19.  
46 Id. ¶ 96.  
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(i) whether the objective being pursued is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a 
protected right; (ii) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective; (iii) whether a 
less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the 
achievement of the objective; and (iv) whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effect 
on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the 
extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter.47 
No debate existed on the first two questions. The parties agreed that the government’s objective, 
“reduction in risk for the protection of health and preservation of life,” was legitimate and sufficiently 
important in principle to justify limiting the right to worship.48 Moreover, a rational connection existed 
between that objective and the government’s decision to ban many public gatherings. “It is not 
irrational to conclude,” Lord Braid wrote, “that the more people stay at home, the less the virus will be 
passed on.”49  
Lord Braid concluded, however, that the total ban on communal worship was not necessary to 
achieve the government’s aim. Several factors influenced his decision, including the authorities’ 
apparent concession that the risk of transmission in public worship was relatively small and their failure 
even to consider less restrictive measures, such as keeping the density of occupants low and providing 
good ventilation.50 The most important consideration, he suggested, was the fact that the authorities 
had allowed some exceptions to the ban on public gatherings, thus acknowledging, at least implicitly, 
that meetings could “be safe if suitable mitigation measures [were] adopted.”51 If it was not too risky, 
for example, to open movie theaters as jury centers as long as people observed mitigation 
requirements, why was it too risky to open places of worship?52 The existence of exceptions showed 
that the government could equally achieve its aims through a measure less intrusive than an outright 
ban.53 
Lord Braid dismissed deferring to public health authorities because “a scientific judgment [was] 
involved”54 and the authorities possessed “expertise and experience” he lacked.55 The “science” was 
“not in dispute.”56 Everyone agreed that Covid was “an extremely serious and highly transmissible 
disease which can result in serious illness and death,” and that mitigation measures like “social 
distancing, face masks, hand washing and good ventilation” could “reduce the risk of transmission.”57 
The ban on communal worship failed the necessity test, not because anyone questioned the science, but 
because the authorities had not explained why, given the scientific consensus, some public gatherings 
could proceed safely with mitigation measures but communal worship could not. This inconsistency 
undercut whatever deference the court might have given to the authorities’ expertise and experience.  
 
47 Id. ¶ 100.  
48 Id. ¶ 101. 
49 Id. ¶ 102.  
50 Id. ¶ 112.  
51 Id. ¶ 114.  
52 See id.  
53 Id. ¶ 115.  
54 Id. ¶ 106. 
55 Id. ¶ 111. 
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
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Lord Braid’s decision that the ban was not necessary could have ended the proportionality 
analysis—as we have seen, courts frequently stop at this point—but he continued to step four, the 
balancing stage, “for completeness and in case I am wrong.”58 Regarding the risk avoided, only a 
relatively small number of persons with Covid-19 infections apparently had attended religious services, 
“in comparison with other activities.”59 A total ban on communal worship, therefore, would not likely 
contribute “to a material reduction” in the risk of Covid transmission.60 Moreover, the existence of 
exceptions in other circumstances undercut the benefit of a “‘bright-line’” rule respecting religious 
gatherings.61 By contrast, the authorities had underestimated the importance of the right to manifest 
one’s religion, especially compared with other activities they had determined to be “essential” and 
allowed to continue.62 True, the ban was only temporary (though it had stretched on for months) and 
believers could participate in online worship.63 Some believers evidently found this arrangement 
unobjectionable.64 But online worship was at best “an alternative to, not a substitute for,” communal in-
person worship—“worship-lite,” Lord Braid called it—and, as a result of the ban, some important 
ceremonies could not occur at all, including communion, baptism, and confession.65 Even though the 
question was “finely balanced,” the burdens of a total ban on communal worship outweighed the 
benefits.66  
 As this summary shows, intuitive judgments had a central role in Philip. Consider the necessity 
determination. Whether a public-health measure goes too far is not a question with a categorical 
answer. It is a judgment call depending on many factors, including the nature of the risk, the relative 
importance of the activities restricted, and, crucially, the credibility of public-health officials who might, 
because of their professional commitments, dismiss religious viewpoints.67 For Lord Braid, the 
temporary ban on communal worship was excessive, given the risks involved, and in the circumstances, 
he felt he could evaluate the evidence himself and need not give public-health officials the benefit of the 
doubt. The point is not that he was wrong. The point is a judge with contrary views could just as 
plausibly have drawn the lines differently. “Narrower tailoring,” as Cass Sunstein observes, “is almost 
always imaginable.”68 
Intuitive judgments also figured centrally in step four, which expressly required Lord Braid to 
weigh competing benefits and burdens. His conclusion in this respect depended on intuitive and 
 
58 Id. ¶ 118.  
59 Id. ¶ 119.  
60 Id.  
61 See id. ¶ 125.  
62 Id. Debates about which activities were “essential” also took place in other countries applying the 
proportionality test. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 8, at 6 (Spain and Brazil).  
63 See Philip et al., [2021] CSOH 32 ¶ 121. 
64 See id. ¶ 123. 
65 Id. ¶ 121; id. ¶ 62 (“worship-lite”).  
66 Id. ¶ 126.  
67 For an interesting discussion of why the public-health professionals might systematically undervalue religious 
viewpoints when making decisions, see Donald L. Drakeman, Book Review, Some Second Thoughts about the 
Humanities, 56 ZYGON 732, 736-39 (2021), at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/zygo.12730. “At 
present,” Drakeman observes, “many of the most influential public health professionals are consciously ignoring 
religiously based input.” Id. at 739.  
68 Cass R. Sunstein, Our Anti-Korematsu, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 21-21 (manuscript at 5) (2020), at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3756853.  
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contested assumptions, for example, that in-person, communal worship is equally important during a 
pandemic as obtaining food and that temporarily requiring believers to avail themselves of online 
services imposed an unacceptable cost (“worship lite”). Even many believers did not share those 
assumptions. In Scotland, as in many other places, many religious communities supported temporary 
restrictions on gathering.69 Again, Lord Braid’s conclusion was certainly plausible. But a judge with 
different assumptions, applying the same proportionality analysis, could just as plausibly have reached 
the opposite conclusion—as some UK judges did, with respect to other Covid restrictions.70  
The U.S. Cases: General Applicability under Smith 
The U.S. Covid cases likewise have turned on judicial line drawing and balancing. This might 
come as a surprise, since, as a formal matter, U.S. law does not rely on the proportionality test. In 
practice, though, during the Covid crisis, U.S. courts have acted very much like their foreign 
counterparts. Under the pressure of the pandemic, as Collings and Barclay observe, the legal 
“framework” has not mattered much.71 The “‘priors’” of individual judges—their normative 
commitments and intuitions about the comparative virtues and importance of religious exercise—have 
mattered more.72 And those, quite evidently, have differed greatly.  
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court announced a test that was supposed to preclude 
judicial balancing in religious freedom cases. Under Employment Division v. Smith, a neutral, generally 
applicable law that only incidentally burdens religious exercise is presumptively constitutional.73 Such a 
law receives only minimal, “rational basis” review, which is virtually impossible to fail.74 Only where a 
law is not neutral and generally applicable—that is, where the law substantially burdens religious 
conduct more than analogous non-religious conduct—does “strict scrutiny” apply.75 In those 
circumstances, the state must show that the law serves a compelling governmental interest and does so 
only as far as necessary.76 The state must show that it could not equally achieve its interest in a way that 
burdens religious exercise to a lesser degree.77  
The Smith Court evidently believed that the neutral-and-generally-applicable test would limit 
occasions for judicial balancing and promote predictability.78 During the Covid crisis, the opposite has 
occurred. The neutrality requirement has not posed much problem.79 With a couple of possible 
 
69 Philip et al., [2021] CSOH 32 ¶ 123. Martínez-Torrón observes that religious communities were especially 
deferential to government restrictions early in the crisis, but less so as time passed. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 8, 
at 9-11.  
70 See, e.g., Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 28-29).  
71 See id. (manuscript at 3-4).  
72 Kislowicz, supra note 22, at 47 (citation omitted).  
73 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (1990).  
74 See KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 31 (2006). 
75 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007). 
76 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 115 (4th ed. 2016).  
77 See id. 
78 See Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 14) (arguing that Smith “openly and energetically 
eschewed any meaningful form of interest-balancing”); see also MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note xx, at 146; Kent 
Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 152-53 (2004).  
79 See Jiwoon Kong, Note, Safeguarding the Free Exercise of Religion during the Covid-19 Pandemic, 89 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1589, 1609 (2021). For an argument that the Court should have resolved the Covid cases under the neutrality 
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exceptions, U.S. authorities have not targeted religion during the pandemic, though some have acted 
with comparative “‘indifference,’”80 as in New York City, where Mayor de Blasio downplayed the 
importance of worship in comparison with political protests.81 General applicability has proved 
troublesome, however.82 The requirement has puzzled scholars for decades and the pandemic has 
intensified the tensions.83 Whether public-health measures like Covid restrictions are generally 
applicable is not an objective matter, but a question of judgment that turns on implicit balancing—an 
assessment of the “comparative risks and importance of certain activities.”84 In the Covid crisis, with so 
many unknowns and so much at stake, judges have found it impossible to reach consensus. 
Consider the shifting decisions of the Supreme Court. Early in the pandemic, in South Bay United 
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay I), by a vote of 5-4, the Court refused to enjoin a California 
measure limiting “attendance at places of worship to 25% of building capacity or a maximum of 100 
attendees.”85 Like the Court’s other Covid cases, South Bay I was part of the Court’s “shadow docket”—
an emergency application for injunctive relief—and the Court did not issue an opinion.86 Nonetheless, it 
is clear that the general applicability requirement divided the justices.87 For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts, who voted with the majority, noted that California had imposed similar or stricter restrictions 
on “comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and 
theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods.”88 
Consequently, the California measure merited only minimal review, especially during a public health 
emergency that counseled deference to expert opinion.89 By contrast, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent 
argued that the measure was not generally applicable, since “comparable secular businesses [were] not 
subject to” the cap, “including factories, offices, supermarkets, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, 
pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries.”90 Two months later, in 
Calvary Chapel v. Sisolak,91 the Court again divided 5-4 in refusing to enjoin a Nevada restriction on 
 
requirement rather than the general applicability requirement, see Mark Storslee, COVID-19, Neutrality, and the 
Free Exercise of Religion, 37 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2022).  
80 See Sunstein, supra note 67, at 5-6 (“‘selective sympathy and indifference’”) (citation omitted). On one possible 
example of hostility, see Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222, 229 (2nd Cir. 2020) (Park, J., dissenting) 
(discussing New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s remarks about ultra-Orthodox Jews).  
81 See Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F.Supp.3d 268, 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).  
82 See Note, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 7, at 1788.  
83 See id. at 1785. Cf. James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)honesty, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 689, 691 (noting that 
“inconsistencies and uncertainties have plagued the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence for decades”).  
84 Blackman, supra note 16, at 686.  
85 140 S.Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief).  
86 See Blackman, supra note 16, at 681-82; see also Jim Oleske, Tandon steals Fulton’s thunder: The most important 
free exercise decision since 1990, https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/tandon-steals-fultons-thunder-the-most-
important-free-exercise-decision-since-1990/ (discussing the Court’s disposition of emergency “challenges to Covid 
limits”). On the shadow docket generally, “a range of orders and summary decisions that defy [the Court’s] normal 
procedural regularity,” see William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 
1 (2015).  
87 Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise’s Lingering Ambiguity, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 282, 289-90 (2020). This is so even 
though the justices “did not directly engage” with Smith. Id. at 289.  
88 South Bay I, 140 S.Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J.).  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief). 
91 140 S.Ct. 2603 (2020). 
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places of worship, with the dissenters again protesting that the restriction did not apply to comparable 
“activities that involve extended, indoor gatherings of large groups of people,” including casinos.92  
A few months after that, though, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,93 the Court, 
by a vote of 5-4, enjoined a New York measure that looked very much like the ones it had permitted in 
South Bay I and Calvary Chapel. The measure divided the state into color-coded zones. In “red” zones, 
where the danger of contagion was high, the state restricted attendance at places of worship to 10 
persons; in “orange” zones, where the risk of contagion was somewhat less, to 25.94 Once again, the 
Justices disagreed about general applicability. For the members of the majority, New York had imposed 
stricter limits on places of worship than comparable, non-religious gatherings. For example, Justice 
Gorsuch noted that the state allowed people to gather for long periods in laundromats and hardware 
stores, among other places.95 By contrast, the dissenters argued that the proper comparator for 
religious services was the set of activities involving “large groups of people gathering, speaking, and 
singing in close proximity indoors for extended periods”— theaters and concert halls, for example.96 By 
that measure, New York had treated religious and non-religious activities alike. Indeed, New York had 
treated religious activities better than it had their secular counterparts.97 
The debate continued in two subsequent cases. In South Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom 
(South Bay II), a divided Court enjoined California’s ban on indoor worship services.98 Justice Gorsuch 
argued in a concurrence that the prohibition was not generally applicable, since most retail stores 
continued to operate at 25% capacity.99 By contrast, Justice Kagan’s dissent argued that the proper 
comparator was the set of secular gatherings California had banned along with religious services—
political meetings, for example—and criticized the majority for “displac[ing] the judgments of experts 
about how to respond to a raging pandemic.”100 Finally, in Tandon v. Newsom, the Court enjoined, 5-4, 
California’s ban on at-home religious gatherings of more than three households.101 The majority 
maintained that California had treated “comparable secular activities” better than at-home religious 
gatherings, since it had allowed retail stores, movie theaters, and restaurants, among other locations, to 
admit more than three households at a time.102 In dissent, Justice Kagan again disagreed, arguing that 
the “obvious comparator” was not retail operations, but at-home, non-religious gatherings, which 
California had also limited to no more than three households.103 Viewed in that light, the restriction 
applied generally to religious and secular activities.  
The Court has thus found it impossible to stick to a consistent position regarding the general 
applicability requirement and Covid restrictions on places of worship. This is not surprising. Whatever 
 
92 Id. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief).  
93 141 S.Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).  
94 Id. at 66. 
95 Id. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
96 Id. at 79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 80.  
98 141 S.Ct. 716 (2021). The majority declined to enjoin other restrictions, in part because the record was not 
sufficiently clear. See id. at 717 (Barrett, J., concurring in the partial grant of application for injunctive relief).  
99 Id. at 717 (Statement of Gorsuch, J.). 
100 Id. at 720 (Kagan. J., dissenting).  
101 141 S.Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).  
102 Id. at 1297. 
103 Id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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the Smith Court hoped, general applicability has always depended on judicial line drawing, and “in a 
pandemic, the line-drawing problems are challenging.”104 Notwithstanding scoffing by some on both 
sides, finding the right comparator for religious services in these cases was “not straightforward.”105 In 
terms of risk of contagion, places of worship are not entirely like factories, restaurants, shopping malls, 
and casinos, but not entirely unlike them, either.106 Whether worship services were “close enough” to 
activities the state had permitted was a question without a categorical answer. Deference to public 
health authorities could not resolve things, because it, too, depended on judicial line drawing.107 All 
agreed the Court should defer to the experts to some extent. But how far?  
It seems apparent that the justices drew the lines in these cases, based not so much on the 
similarity or dissimilarity between places of worship and other locations, but on whether the authorities 
had fairly excluded worship services from the set of activities they had permitted.108 This necessarily 
entailed implicit balancing and “value judgments” about the importance of religious exercise, compared 
to things like grocery shopping and dining out, and the need to accommodate some religious 
believers.109 These matters greatly divide conservative and progressive Americans, including 
conservative and progressive justices. Notably, the Court switched its position, from acquiescing in the 
restrictions in South Bay I and Calvary Chapel to forbidding them in Roman Catholic Diocese, South Bay 
II, and Tandon, after Justice Barrett, a conservative, replaced Justice Ginsburg, a progressive, thus 
altering the philosophical balance on the Court. I have more to say about this below. 
Strict Scrutiny and Proportionality: Intuition and Balancing 
The decisions in Roman Catholic Diocese, South Bay II, and Tandon made clear that the Court 
would subject Covid restrictions to strict scrutiny. As a formal matter, strict scrutiny differs from 
proportionality analysis, for example, with respect to the “framing” of the right in question.110 Strict 
scrutiny applies only to “fundamental” rights, while the proportionality test applies to rights more 
generally.111 Moreover, strict scrutiny requires that the state have a “compelling” interest to justify its 
measure, not merely a “legitimate” one.112 Finally, strict scrutiny does not formally call for judicial 
balancing.113 The proportionality test, by contrast, expressly requires a court to weigh the relative costs 
 
104 Sunstein, supra note 67, at 14.  
105 Id. at 3; see also id. at 14. Questions about whether permitted non-religious gatherings were comparable to 
prohibited religious gatherings occupied courts outside the United States as well. See Collings and Barclay, supra 
note 11 (manuscript at 25-27). 
106 See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[i]t would be foolish to 
pretend that worship services are exactly like any of the possible comparisons”); see also Rothschild, supra note 4 
(manuscript at 45 & n.222).  
107 Questions about how much deference to give public health authorities occupied courts outside the United 
States as well. See Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 34-40). 
108 Cf. Rothschild, supra note 4 (manuscript at 47) (arguing that “the real constitutional question” that divided the 
justices in South Bay I “was whether it could be said that California was discriminating against religion by having 
different standards for church gatherings and certain secular gatherings”).  
109 Note, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 7, at 1790; see also Blackman, supra note 16, at 686.  
110 Greene, supra note 11, at 57.  
111 Id.  
112 Compare MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 75, at 115 (strict scrutiny), with YOWELL, supra note 12, at 16 
(proportionality).  
113 See Oleske, supra note 82, at 740-41.  
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and benefits of a measure (though “many” courts “frequently” skip this step in practice and may 
“smuggl[e]” balancing into the necessity requirement).114 
Nonetheless, one should not overstate the dissimilarities, and, in the Covid crisis, at least, the 
two tests have worked out essentially the same.115 The framing of the right has not made a difference in 
this context, since all concede the fundamental character of the right to worship. Similarly, no one 
doubts the state has a compelling interest in reducing the spread of Covid. Proportionality’s necessity 
requirement outside the United States has performed a similar function as strict scrutiny’s least-
restrictive means test inside the United States.116 In Philip, recall, Lord Braid described the necessity 
requirement in words an U.S. judge could have used to describe U.S. law. The question, he wrote, was 
“whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the 
achievement of the [state’s] objective.”117 
Finally, whatever the formalities, in practice strict scrutiny often operates as a balancing test, 
requiring courts to make “all-things-considered” judgments about the relative weight of competing 
social goods, especially where a measure would “reduce risks of harm rather than eliminate them.”118 
That is what has happened in the Covid context. Judges applying strict scrutiny have weighed whether a 
limitation on collective worship is “justifiable in light of the benefits likely to be achieved and the 
available alternatives.”119 And they have done so based on “priors”— intuitions about things like the 
importance of collective worship, the need to “follow the science,” and the competence and goodwill of 
regulatory authorities. 
Consider South Bay II.120 The Court did not address strict scrutiny in its per curiam opinion, but, 
writing separately, Justice Gorsuch did, and a majority agreed with the heart of his analysis.121 Gorsuch 
characterized strict scrutiny as a balancing test opposing the interests of religious believers to those of 
the public more generally. In such cases, he wrote, “courts nearly always face an individual’s claim of 
constitutional right pitted against the government’s claim of special expertise in a matter of high 
importance involving public health and safety.”122 Here, California had a compelling interest in stopping 
the spread of Covid, but religious believers had a right to worship, and California had not sufficiently 
explained why it could not honor that right and still achieve its stated objectives.123 For example, the 
state could have required places of worship to adopt the social distancing measures it had mandated for 
 
114 Collings and Barclay, supra note 11 (manuscript at 21).  
115 On the similarity between the two tests generally, see YOWELL, supra note 12, at 20-21. 
116 Cf. id. at 23 (arguing generally for the similarity of the least-restrictive means and necessity requirements).  
117 Reverend Dr William J U Philip and Others, [2021] CSOH 32, ¶100. 
118 Fallon, supra note 74, at 1272; see also see also Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, 
and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 581 (2015); Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: 
Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1907 (2015).  
119 Fallon, supra note 74, at 1272. 
120 141 S.Ct. 716 (2021). 
121 Id. at 717 (Statement of Gorsuch, J.). Justices Thomas and Alito joined Gorsuch’s statement in full. Justices 
Barrett and Kavanaugh agreed with Gorsuch’s analysis of the ban on indoor worship but disagreed with his 
conclusion that California’s ban on singing during indoor services also violated the First Amendment, because, in 
their view, the record on that question was unclear. Id. (Barrett, J., concurring in the partial grant of application for 
injunctive relief).  
122 Id. at 718 (Statement of Gorsuch, J.).  
123 See id.  
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“many secular settings.”124 It could have restricted occupancy, imposed reasonable time limits, or given 
places of worship the option of offering regular Covid testing.125 Any of these alternatives would have 
constrained believers’ free exercise rights less than a total ban and still allowed California to reach its 
stated public health goals. 
Justice Gorsuch appeared unperturbed by the fact that public health experts evidently disagreed 
that narrower measures would equally reduce the spread of Covid. “Of course we are not scientists,” he 
conceded, but judges should not defer to experts where constitutional rights were at stake.126 He did 
not put it this way, exactly, but he obviously believed that balancing the interests of some religious 
believers and the public at large was a matter for the courts, not epidemiologists. Besides, public health 
experts had burned their credibility by “moving the goalposts on pandemic-related sacrifices for 
months, adopting new benchmarks that always seem to put restoration of liberty just around the 
corner.”127  
Like Lord Braid in Philip, in South Bay II, Justice Gorsuch balanced competing social goods and 
concluded that the costs of the state’s measure, in terms of the restriction on believers’ rights, 
outweighed the benefits, in terms of reducing the spread of disease. And, like Lord Braid, he did so 
based on intuitions—“naked judicial instinct,” Justice Kagan complained in dissent—that many would 
not share.128 To give just one example, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion turned on the assumption that 
temporarily banning indoor gathering substantially burdened believers. As in Scotland, however, many 
congregations in California easily adjusted to restrictions on in-person worship.129 “Given California’s 
mild climate,” Justice Kagan protested, forbidding indoor gathering did “not amount to a ban” on 
worship.130 Believers could continue to worship outdoors; in fact, “[w]orship services” had “taken place 
outdoors throughout this winter.”131 
Justice Kagan also expressed dismay at the Court’s dismissal of experts’ conclusions on the 
measures necessary to reduce contagion. “[I]t is alarming,” she wrote, “that the Court second-guesses 
the judgment of expert officials,” since, “[t]o state the obvious, judges do not know what scientists and 
public health experts do.”132 The Court had substituted “judicial edict” for “science-based policy.”133 But 
whether, and how far, to defer to experts is itself a judgment call that depends on one’s confidence in 
the experts’ consistency and good faith, as well as one’s assessment of the gravity of the risk and the 
costs deference imposes on important rights like free exercise.134 On those matters, Justices Gorsuch 
and Kagan evidently disagreed. Both made plausible arguments. The point is that judges applying strict 
 
124 Id. at 718-19. 
125 Id. at 719; id. at 720.  
126 Id. at 718.  
127 Id. at 720.  
128 141 S.Ct. at 723 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
129 See supra text accompanying note 63 (discussing Philip), text accompanying note 68 (same).  
130 South Bay II, 141 S.Ct. at 721 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 723. 
133 Id.  
134 Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 27 (2020) (noting that a court’s 
rigorousness in applying strict scrutiny might “depend on its assessment of the gravity of the pandemic”).  
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scrutiny in the same case easily can reach different conclusions if they start with different priors about 
fundamental matters. 
In short, in the Covid crisis, doctrinal differences have had relatively little significance. Under 
either the proportionality test outside the United States, or Employment Division v. Smith inside the 
United States, courts have decided cases based mostly on intuition and balancing. Undoubtedly, the 
pressure of the crisis explains much. In a public-health emergency, where speed is essential and hard 
information difficult to obtain, intuitive assessments may be the best one can do. But crises often clarify, 
and the Covid pandemic has done so. Notwithstanding formal differences, in their case-by-case 
character and reliance on individual judgment, proportionality analysis and strict scrutiny have shown 
themselves in this episode to be more alike than different.135 In some circumstances, where debate 
exists about the importance of the right in question or the strength of the state’s interest, 
proportionality and strict scrutiny may cash out differently. But the Covid crisis has revealed that the 
two tests share significant affinities.  
Judicial Partisanship and Cultural Divisions in the United States 
Let me now turn, briefly, to what the pandemic has revealed about U.S. law, specifically. Here, 
the story is not one of affinity but division. The Court’s inconsistent decisions in the Covid cases reflect a 
cultural and partisan divide respecting religion and religious freedom. True, that is not the only fissure 
that exists in the United States today. The Covid crisis has revealed other disagreements as well, for 
example, about the competence of government, the credibility of scientific experts, and other matters. 
And the pandemic did not create our religious divide, which has been growing for decades, and which 
has influenced the Court’s response to other legal questions as well.136 But the current public health 
crisis, affecting hundreds of millions of Americans simultaneously, has intensified our religious divide 
and made it impossible to ignore.137 In the crisis, the lack of a “shared baseline” with respect to religious 
freedom has become quite manifest.138  
Where cultural consensus exists on an issue, balancing tests like strict scrutiny work reasonably 
predictably. Results differ in specific cases, but judges tend to weigh rights and interests in foreseeable 
ways that conform to social expectations.139 Where consensus does not exist, however, balancing tests 
become more problematic.140 In that context, outcomes turn on the personal worldviews of the judges 
who happen to hear a case—and given the lack of consensus, those worldviews may vary considerably. 
In the absence of shared cultural understanding, judges inevitably rely on their “own moral 
 
135 On similarities between proportionality and strict scrutiny generally, see YOWELL, supra note 12, at 9, 20-21. 
136 See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 158-59 (2014) (noting how the cultural 
consensus in favor of religious accommodations has dissolved and the affect this has had on legal decisions). 
137 See Storslee, supra note 78, manuscript at 3 (observing that “the COVID cases further aggravated an already 
politicized debate about the Free Exercise Clause”).  
138 Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 
937 (2019).  
139 Cf. Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological and Cultural (Not Political) Realism, in HOW 
LAW KNOWS 93, 114 (Austin Sarat et al., eds., 2007) (observing that where “values and norms” are “widely shared,” 
most judges “will find no difficulty reaching agreement”).   
140 See id. at 103 (observing that “in cases that are the focus of competition between cultural groups in society at 
large . . . the evidence suggests that cultural cognition leads [judges] in different directions”).  
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backgrounds” and commitments and weigh interests differently.141 As a result, judicial balancing 
becomes “unpredictable” and legal doctrine “incoherent.”142 One would especially expect this to be the 
case in an emergency, where access to reliable information is uncertain and the potential consequences 
severe, and where the sense of crisis swamps the effect of professional training that might otherwise 
encourage greater judicial detachment.143   
The shifting results in the Court’s Covid cases reflect this dynamic. The historical U.S. consensus 
on the beneficence of religion—the traditional idea that “religion is valuable and . . . legal rules should 
be crafted for the purpose of protecting that value”144—no longer exists. Americans have not become 
uniformly irreligious; rather, they have become polarized, and the polarization expresses itself, more 
and more, in partisan terms.145 Increasingly, Republicans are the party of traditional believers, especially 
conservative Christians, while Democrats are the party of Nones and secular Americans.146 Some 
exceptions exist. Black Christians strongly identify as Democrats, for example, as do the relatively small 
number of Americans who consider themselves part of the “Religious Left.”147 Overall, though, the 
religious/secular divide between the two parties appears consistently in social surveys.  
This partisan divide affects judicial appointments—and, through them, judicial decisions. As 
Devins and Baum show in a recent study, “presidents increasingly choose [judicial] nominees who … 
adhere strongly to their parties’ dominant ideological tendency,”148 so that “credible [judicial] 
candidates from either party are likely to reflect the ideological gap that separates” Democrats from 
Republicans.149 In the free exercise context, one would expect Democratic presidents to nominate 
judges who sympathize with the secularism that increasingly defines that party and Republican 
presidents to nominate judges who sympathize with the GOP’s pro-religious orientation. Presidents 
have a handily differentiated set of candidates from which to choose. Legal elites today are as divided as 
the rest of the country, if not more, and competing progressive and conservative networks exist to help 
 
141 Kislowicz, supra note 22, at 42.  
142 Alan Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue: A Discussion of Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause 
and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 605, 638 (2012). 
143 On how professional experience and training may diminish the effects of judges’ political and ideological 
commitments, see Kahan et al., supra note 18, at 354-55. 
144 Andrew Koppelman, Neutrality and the Religion Analogy, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 165, 165 (Kevin Vallier & 
Michael Weber, eds., 2018). 
145 See, e.g., MASON, supra note 23, at 14, 33, 37.  
146 See Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
711, 747-48 (2019); see also Sisk and Heise, supra note 18, at 1205, 1233-36. 
147 See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, FAITH AMONG BLACK AMERICANS 120 (Feb. 16, 2021) (“Black adults from all religious 
backgrounds are strongly Democratic.”); Frank Newport, The Religious Left Has a Numbers Problem, Gallup’s 
Polling Matters, at https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/258032/religious-left-numbers-problem.aspx 
(noting the comparatively weak “influence of the religious left within the Democratic party”) (emphasis omitted).  
148 NEAL DEVINS AND LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP 13 (2019).  
149 Id. at 121. But cf. Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy in Judicial Decision Making: Evidence from 
Securities Fraud Actions, 3 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 497, 508 (2006) (noting that with respect to lower-court 
appointments, “Presidents frequently use their nominating powers to push partisan or personal, rather than 
ideological, agendas”) (citation omitted).  
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identify the right people to fill vacancies on the bench.150 Consequently, presidents of both parties can 
readily select judicial candidates likely to sympathize with their parties’ core commitments. 
The lack of a cultural baseline thus has made judicial decisions on religious freedom more 
subjective and dependent on judges’ partisan identities. Americans today “lack a common measure for 
weighing the importance of practicing one’s religion against other important concerns,”151 and, as a 
result, a balancing test like strict scrutiny, which depends so heavily on judges’ priors, leads inevitably to 
politically polarized results. Exactly that pattern has appeared in the U.S. Covid cases.152 A study by 
Zalman Rothschild of more than 100 Covid cases in the federal courts reveals that not a single 
Democratic-appointed judge has ruled in favor of religious plaintiffs in any of them.153 By contrast, “66% 
of Republican-appointed judges” have done so, and “82% of Trump-appointed judges.”154 This partisan 
breakdown has held true at the Supreme Court as well as in the lower courts.155 Democratic-appointed 
justices consistently have ruled against religious plaintiffs in Covid cases. Republican-appointed justices, 
with one exception, consistently have ruled for religious plaintiffs, and, as we have seen, the 
appointment of Justice Barrett to replace the late Justice Ginsburg during the pandemic decisively 
shifted the Court in their favor.156  
Again, the Covid crisis did not create this situation. The polarization I describe has been growing 
for decades—an aspect of our ongoing culture wars.157 The crisis has highlighted those divisions, 
however. How could it be otherwise? The pandemic has presented difficult questions in a context of 
great uncertainty and consequence and has required judges to make quick decisions without the benefit 
of regular briefing or argument. And it has done so in a context of deep social and political dissensus on 
the value and scope of religious freedom. In this environment, it is not surprising that judges would fall 
back on their priors and decide cases differently. Indeed, a consensual resolution in this setting hardly 
seems possible.158 It is not a wonder that judicial balancing in the Covid cases has been so partisan and 
controversial. The wonder would be if that were not the case. 
Conclusion 
 In an essay in April 2021, Javier Martínez-Torrón wrote about what legal scholars can learn from 
the Covid pandemic. The most important lessons, he suggested, do not relate to “concrete” 
 
150 See DEVINS AND BAUM, supra note 146, at 112 (noting the “more pronounced” divisions among elites than exist 
“in the general population”); id. at 117 (noting “the emergence of distinct career paths for conservatives and 
liberals” among legal elites).  
151 Storslee, supra note 137, at 937.  
152 Cf. Sisk and Heise, supra note 18, at 1238 (observing that partisan differences have also begun to “percolat[e]” 
into the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence).  
153 Rothschild, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3).  
154 Id.  
155 Id. (manuscript at 43-44). 
156 See Blackman, supra note 16, at 638.  
157 On the U.S.’s culture wars generally, see JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
(1992).  
158 See Wright, supra note 21, at 194. In the Establishment Clause context, Micah Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe 
have identified what they describe as a pattern of “appeasement” by progressive justices, who offer conservative 
justices “unilateral concessions for the purpose of avoiding further conflict.” Micah Schwartzman and Nelson 
Tebbe, Establishment Clause Appeasement, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 272. Whatever the situation in the 
Establishment Clause context, such a pattern has not appeared so far in the Covid cases.  
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particulars—the details of specific restrictions and the holdings of specific cases.159 Like all pandemics, 
this one will eventually end, and paying too much attention to the finer points of courts’ responses to it 
would be a mistake. Rather, scholars should concentrate on what the Covid cases reveal about the law 
more generally, about “already familiar” questions that “manifest with special clarity in moments of 
crisis.”160 Most of all, scholars should focus “on what this pandemic teaches us about ourselves, that is, 
about our societies, our conception of political organization, [and] our understanding … of fundamental 
rights, including freedom of religion or belief.”161 
In this essay, I have drawn two such lessons, one comparative and one relating specifically to 
U.S. law. As a comparative matter, the crisis suggests significant affinities between the proportionality 
test courts outside the United States favor and the U.S. approach under Employment Division v. Smith. 
Doctrinal differences have not had much practical significance, at least during the crisis. Both in the 
United States and abroad, courts ultimately have struck a balance between the competing interests at 
stake, those of some religious believers and those of the public more generally, and have relied on 
intuition and normative commitments about the comparative importance of religious exercise. With 
respect to the United States, specifically, the Covid cases reveal a cultural and political divide that makes 
consensual resolution of conflicts over religious freedom increasingly problematic, and sometimes 
impossible, even during a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic. 
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